Do banks really monitor? Evidence from CEO succession decisions

We demonstrate that banks play an important monitoring role in CEO succession that is not observed for other types of lenders, particularly public bondholders. There is a stronger relation between cash flow performance and forced CEO turnover for firms issuing bank debt during the year of CEO turnover than for firms not issuing bank debt, and bank debt issuance increases the likelihood of external CEO succession. The stock price reaction to CEO succession is higher when bank monitoring is prevalent. Our results are consistent with theories of relationship banking that propose a valuable monitoring role for well informed, incentivized bank lenders.     

试析监测与监控技术在桥梁施工中的价值

目前,我国现代化进程不断加快,桥梁的建设也日趋现代化。因此,加强桥梁施工的监测与监控管理,提高监测与监控技术,进一步确保桥梁施工的进度和质量,为国家和社会做出该有的贡献。     

高职院校教学质量监督和保障体系的研究与实践

本论文通过对南京化工职业技术学院教学质量监控和保障体系的研究、构建与实施,并通过网络信息技术使体系的运行更顺利、便捷和高效,增强了教学质量监控和保障体系的针对性、可操作性,做到保障有方向、投入有重点、建设有力度、完善有策略,确保教学质量保障建设有理、有据、有序进行。     

艺术类高校质量监控体系存在的问题及对策研究

本文从艺术类高校质量监控的传统形式出发,分析了当前艺术类高校教学质量监控体系存在的问题,并根据艺术类学校的特点,针对艺术类院校教学监控体系中存在的问题提出了对策。     

地方财政压力与投资多样性——基于所得税分享改革的研究

利用企业所得税分享改革构建强度倍差模型，使用1997—2012年全国地级市数据，检验了地方财政压力对于投资多样性的影响及相关传导机制。结果表明，地方财政压力不利于投资多样性的提高；在财政压力下，地方容易形成偏向房地产行业的投资倾向。然而，不同地区地方财政压力对投资结构的影响存在异质性。经济发展水平较低的地区在财政压力下更容易降低投资多样性；而经济发展水平高的地区应对财政压力时，更倾向于通过多元化投资的方式做大税基、减轻财政压力。优化分税制结构、建立地方性税种能缓解地方财政压力，对于改变地方“房地产集中型”投资结构有一定的积极作用。     

The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex,lies, and firm value

Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firm's business activities but provide information about the manager's integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firm's value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.     

Effects of Ownership Structure on Capital Structure of Indian Listed Firms: Role of Business Groups vis-à-vis Stand-Alone Firms

The objective of this study was to explore the relationship between promoter ownership and capital structure of firms’ using a sample of Indian publicly listed firms for the period from 2006 to 2013. We find that the relationship between promoter ownership and leverage is inversely U-shaped in group-affiliated firms, whereas in stand-alone firms there is a U-shaped relationship. We argue that a substantial presence of family owners and the selection of managers from within the family play some role for such relationship in group-affiliated firms. On the other hand, the argument for observed relationship in stand-alone firms follows from alignment hypothesis, entrenchment hypothesis, managerial risk aversion hypothesis, and active monitoring hypothesis.     

Government Engagement,Environmental Policy,and Environmental Performance: Evidence from the Most Polluting Chinese Listed Firms

This study empirically examines the implementation of environmental policies and how government engagement impacts on a firm's environmental performance based on a sample of Chinese listed firms in the eight most polluting industries over a 10‐year period. The findings of the study demonstrate that government engagement, measured as ownership structure, is positively correlated with environmental performance, measured by environmental capital expenditure, for state‐owned firms, but no significant relation is found for non‐state‐owned firms. In addition, non‐state‐owned firms are more likely to perform better in terms of environmental investment after the 2006 enactment of a new policy explicitly linking environmental issues with political incentives to regional governments. This study also reports that corporate environmental performance impairs firm value for state‐owned firms but has no impact on firm value for non‐state‐owned firms, suggesting that investors negatively respond to environmental investments made by state‐owned firms as a result of government engagement/political pressure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

高职院校环境监测实践教学改革探索

本文分析了高职院校环境监测实践教学中存在的问题,从实践参与教学模式、实践教学方法及考核、评价方式等方面进行了一系列的探索和尝试。     

Institutional Monitoring: Evidence from the F‐Score

The extant literature shows that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance a firm's long‐term value. Measuring firm performance using the F‐Score, we examine the persistent monitoring role of institutional investors and identify the financial aspects of a firm that institutional monitoring improves. We find strong evidence that long‐term institutions with large shareholdings consistently improve a firm's F‐Score and that such activity occurs primarily through the enhancement of the firm's operating efficiency. Other institutions reduce a firm's F‐Score. Moreover, we find evidence that, while monitoring institutions improve a firm's financial health, transient (followed by non‐transient) institutions trade on this information.